Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is complicated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access law as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference estimations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a significant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Introduction
While it is widely accepted that competition is a salient prerequisite for the efficient functioning of markets for goods and services, the precise role of competition in politics is less evident. Numerous authors like Becker (1983 Becker ( , 1985 and Wittman (1989) have argued that political competition enhances the efficiency of democracies. This view contrasts with the work of Demsetz (1982) and others which stresses potential drawbacks of electoral competition. Lizzeri and Persico (2005) , for instance, argue that more competition forces parties to focus on the interests of a narrower constituency thereby strengthening the influence of special interests.
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The empirical evidence, however, indicates that political competition is indeed important for mitigating agency problems that are prevalent in politics. Glenn and Choi (2006) , for instance, show that congressional legislators tend to vote more in line with their own preferences rather than those of their constituency when barriers to competition are raised. Besley et al. (2005) provide evidence suggesting that a considerable part of economic growth in the U.S. can be explained by variation in political competition. According to their interpretation, political competition improves the quality of candidates, thereby fostering economic growth.
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Our investigation starts from the idea that similar to incumbent firms in oligopolistic markets, incumbent political parties might reduce the effective degree of competition by deterring other parties from participating in political contests. Yet, despite the long-lasting normative debate on the role of political competition, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of such 'endogenous' restrictions to political competition is still very limited. To shed light on this issue, we estimate the effect of ballot access requirements on the degree of electoral competition in U.S. House elections as measured by the number of minor party and independent candidates. Ballot access laws specify the conditions potential candidates need to fulfill in order to be listed on the ballot. In the U.S., these restrictions greatly differ between major and minor parties. For major party candidates, the most common route to get a candidate on the ballot is a primary election. Minor parties and independent candidates, however, commonly need to file a petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters.
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When measuring the effectiveness of such ballot access rules, it needs to be taken into account that the state laws specifying the requirements for minor party and independent candidates are subject to changes by the state legislatures. Moreover, with the state legislatures being dominated by the two major parties, it is likely that the design of the respective state laws reflects the major parties' self-interest to limit competition by minor parties and independent candidates. Consequently, a strong demand for participation in elections by potential third-party and independent candidates might trigger more restrictive ballot access requirements.
Of course, if ballot access restrictions are effective in reducing the number of third-party candidates, once these restrictions are in place we will observe low levels of competition. In contrast, if the established parties do not face any competition by candidates of other parties, there is no need to implement particularly restrictive ballot access rules. In such a situation, the stringency of ballot access is endogenously determined, and simple regressions to determine the effectiveness of ballot access requirements in terms of reducing the actual degree of political competition are generally prone to bias. In our example, 3 Despite the fact that a majoritarian voting system as in the U.S. promotes the existence of two dominating political parties (Duverger, 1964) , third party as well as independent candidates frequently appear on the ballot in state as well as federal elections. During the period considered in our analysis (1952 to 1984) , around 17.2% of the races in U.S. House elections saw three candidates, and an additional 8.7% had four or more candidates.
we would observe low levels of competition everywhere, but some states with more and others with less restrictive laws. We may then falsely conclude that ballot access requirements do not affect the degree of political competition.
By recognizing that ballot access regulations cannot, in general, be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions, our study relates to recent work on endogenous political institutions by Aghion et al. (2004) and Trebbi et al. (2007) .
To overcome the endogeneity problem, this study exploits variation in ballot access rules from a natural experiment. In particular, we make use of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Rhodes from 1968 which struck down the highly stringent ballot access law the state of Ohio had enacted in 1951. The resulting sharp decrease in Ohio's signature requirements provides us with variation in ballot access that comes from an arguably exogenous source. Exploiting this exogenous variation allows us to identify the impact of ballot access restrictions on the entry decisions of third party and independent candidates. We estimate the effectiveness of petition requirements as a measure of the stringency of ballot access with data for U.S. House elections from 1952 to 1984. Using electoral districts in other states with stable ballot access regulations as a control group, we show by means of difference-in-difference estimations that the Supreme Court decision of 1968 resulted in a significant increase in the number of minor party candidates.
The magnitude of our estimates can be interpreted quite generally. Between 1951 and 1968 the petition requirements for third party and independent candidates in Ohio were practically insurmountable. Due to the Supreme Court decision, Ohio had to reduce its signature requirements to a level comparable to the moderate regulations existent in most other states. Thus, our difference-in-difference estimations quantify the potential increase in electoral competition if ballot access restrictions were lowered to moderate levels in the remaining states which practically exclude minor party candidates until today.
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Our work is related to a number of earlier contributions. Abramson and Aldrich (1995) and Rosenstone et al. (1996) , for example, study the relevance of third party and independent candidates in the history of U.S. presidential elections. Amorim Neto and Cox (1997) discuss the determinants of the number of parties in general and explain it as an outcome of the interaction between the electoral system and the heterogeneity of the society. One of the first contributions discussing entry barriers in politics and the role of rewards of office to foster electoral competition is provided by Tullock (1965) . Moreover, there are a few empirical studies analyzing the effectiveness of ballot access laws in deterring minor party candidates. Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996) find that higher filing fees increase the frequency of uncontested races and decrease the frequency of retirements when examining congressional elec-4 Georgia, for instance, still requires minor party congressional candidates to file petitions, separately for each congressional district, signed by 5 percent of registered voters eligible to vote in the last election. In order to place its candidates on the ballot in all Georgia districts, a new party would thus have to collect almost 200,000 signatures.
tions from 1984 to 1990. In the same vein, Stratmann (2005) examines the effect of filing fees and signature requirements on the number of candidates in U.S. Lower House elections at the state level in 1998 and 2000. His findings suggest that higher filing fees reduce both the number of major party and minor party candidates. In contrast to Ansolabehere and Gerber (1996) and Stratmann (2005) who do not discuss the problem of endogenous determination of ballot access restrictions and thus rely on the assumption that ballot access is exogenously given, we explicitly address the relevant state laws as being endogenous to the degree of electoral competition. Besides Aghion et al. (2004) and Trebbi et al. (2007) , only a few papers explicitly address the potential endogeneity of political institutions. In a companion paper to this study, we demonstrate that ballot access rules in the U.S. should generally be treated as being endogenously determined (Drometer and Rincke, 2008) .
In fact, the analysis shows that state ballot access laws in the U.S. between 1946 and 1976 have been systematically tightened in response to stronger political competition. In related work dealing with the North Carolina elections in 1992, Hamilton and Lado (1996) find that the design of the ballot may have been chosen strategically by county election boards dominated by the members of one party.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the historical background of Ohio's ballot access laws. The empirical approach and the data are discussed in Section 3. Thereafter, Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes.
The history of ballot access in Ohio
The establishment of election rules was left to the states in the U.S. Constitution of 1788 since its framers did not agree on a unitary election law for the new federal government.
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Access to the ballot remained entirely unregulated during much of the 19th century, and the candidates themselves were allowed to print and distribute ballot papers. As these practices resulted in polling irregularities and discouraged independent candidates due to the immense costs of providing their own ballots, the state governments in the 1890s gradually adopted the Australian Ballot, prescribing that ballots were to be printed and distributed by the state government (Argersinger, 1980) . Consequently, an official nomination procedure for potential candidates had to be established.
These ballot access requirements became increasingly more complex and more stringent in the course of the 20th century. Since ballot access requirements are set by the state legislators, the demands vary considerably both in absolute and relative terms.
The state of Ohio introduced a particularly restrictive ballot access law in 1951. Interestingly, the circumstances of its introduction seem to substantiate the notion that the stringency of entry barriers to political markets can, in 5 See Bott (1990) for a brief history of ballot access in the United States. votes to win the state against the Democratic candidate Thomas Dewey. To rule out the possibility that third candidates prevent a clear victory of one of the major parties, the Ohio legislature adopted a new ballot access law in 1951 which practically excluded any third party candidates (Bott, 1990 ).
To be recognized as a political party, Ohio demanded the submission of a petition signed by 15 percent of the last gubernatorial vote, an independent candidate in a state-wide election needed a petition signed by 7 percent of the last gubernatorial vote, and independent presidential candidates were not permitted. As a consequence, only the two major parties, which had to satisfy less strict requirements, were present in Ohio's political arena in the following years. Unsatisfied with their situation, several minor parties challenged the 
Estimation approach and data
The main purpose of our paper is to provide evidence of the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition. As mentioned in the introduction, the identification of this effect is complicated by the apparent endogeneity of any regulation defining barriers to the entry of new political parties. We present a straightforward approach to solve the identification problem which exploits the Supreme Court decision of 1968 and the resulting significant reduction of ballot access requirements in Ohio as a natural experiment. To qualify as a natural experiment the units of observation need to be affected 6 Cited in Bott (1990, p. 176) .
by a sharp and unexpected change in some key variable of interest (in our case, the restrictiveness of petition requirements for minor party and independent candidates). It is undisputable that the change in Ohio's ballot access laws resulting from the ruling in Williams v. Rhodes qualifies as such an event.
The state moved from being by far the most restrictive state in terms of petition requirements to a position that was very similar to the rules adopted Likewise, in a number of court cases in later years, existing ballot access regulations were confirmed. 8 See e.g. Winger (2002) and Bott (1990 
where #MINOR it is the total number of minor party and independent candidates that were listed on the ballot in district i in year t, α is a constant, and OHIO i × 1970-84 t is the interaction effect of a Ohio state dummy and a dummy for years after 1968, i.e. after the Supreme Court decision on Ohio's ballot access law.
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Moreover, τ t is a year effect and e it is a residual. The coefficient β captures the differential effect of the change in Ohio's ballot access requirements. Note that in some estimations we do not include year effects, but just a single post-shock indicator for years after 1968.
A straightforward alternative to Equation (1) is to allow for a separate inter-action effects for each post-shock year,
where We checked this by searching over the states' revised statutes for changes in ballot access laws for the whole period considered in our analysis. 
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For our analysis we only considered third party and independent candidates that were actually listed on the ballot. Hence, we eliminated writein candidates from our data set and ignored scattered votes. Moreover, we restrict attention to general elections. The numbers in Table 3 confirm that our sample is almost perfectly balanced between districts belonging to either treatment and control group, and observations from pre-as well as post-shock periods.
Results
Before turning to the outcomes of our difference-in-difference estimations, we will first provide an intuition for our results by a comparison of means of the number of third party and independent candidates before and after 1968. As Table 3 shows, the average number of third party and independent candidates on the ballot in Ohio jumped from virtually zero before 1968 to 0.44 on average after 1968. In Illinois, the increase in the number of third party and independent candidates was much less pronounced.
This difference is illustrated in more detail in Figure 1 . Between 1952 and 1968 , in both states the number of third party and independent candidates was close to zero. While Illinois experienced a moderate increase beginning in 1972, the average number of third party and independent candidates in Table 3 and the graphs in Figure 1 give a first impression of the effectiveness of Ohio's ballot access laws before 1968. The evidence suggests that the Supreme Court decision had a strong and immediate impact on electoral competition.
However, we need a more technical approach to substantiate the descriptive evidence. In particular, we would like to check the statistical significance of the effects suggested by the descriptive analysis.
We now turn to the results of our difference-in-difference estimation approach. Graphs show, separately for Ohio and Illinois, average number of third party and independent candidates per district in U.S. House elections, 1952 House elections, -1984 that account for clustering on congressional districts. Since districts boundaries change regularly due to redistricting, we form district-specific clusters for the periods 1952-1960, 1962-1970, 1972-1980, and 1982-1984 , giving a total number of 186 clusters.
Column 1 shows the results for a baseline specification of our difference-indifference model. Besides the interaction term Ohio×1970-84, it accounts only for an Ohio state effect and an indicator for post-shock periods. The increase in the number of third party and independent candidates in Ohio (relative to congressional districts in Illinois) resulting from the Supreme Court decision is estimated to be 0.35 and is significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the treatment effect is notable (recall that the average number of minor party candidates is only 0.12 in our sample).
In Column 2 we replace the indicator for post-shock periods by a full series of year effects. The results are very close to those obtained in Column 1. In Column 3 we split the single treatment effect employed in the first two specifications into a full series of interaction effects, giving a separate treatment effect for each post-shock year. Column 3 thus gives a much more detailed picture of the effects of the change in ballot access on the entry of third party and independent candidates. We note that the estimates for all year-specific treatment effects are positive, with six out of eight estimated coefficients being statistically different from zero at least at the 10% level. The treatment effect is strongest in 1976, indicating that in this particular election the reduction in ballot access requirements is responsible for 0.65 additional congressional candidates in Ohio relative to districts in Illinois.
As mentioned above, the difference-in-difference approach is generally prone to bias in the presence of a treatment-group specific trend which is not properly accounted for in the model. To hedge against such a potential bias, we allow for a time trend specific to districts in Ohio. As the results reported in Column 4 show, the coefficient of the trend itself is not statistically different from zero, and the general picture regarding the treatment effects is unchanged.
Note, however, that now seven out of eight year-specific treatment effects are estimated to be statistically different from zero.
So far we have presented results with observations from the year 1968, i.e. the year of the Supreme Court decision, assigned to the pre-shock period. In order to check the robustness of our findings with respect to this assignment, we excluded these observations and re-estimated the model with the full series of year-specific treatment effects and including the Ohio time trend. The results, displayed in Column 5, are almost identical to those obtained with observations from 1968 assigned to the pre-shock period. We conclude that the assignment of these observations does not critically affect our results.
A well-known further criticism of difference-in-difference estimations is that with many time periods in the sample and significantly serially correlated observations, the approach may overstate the true effects. To account for this objection, we re-estimated both the baseline specification (Column 6) and the model with a full series of year effects, the Ohio time trend and year-specific treatment effects (Column 7) using only observations from the period [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] . This reduces the number of observations to 427. Again, our results prove to be highly robust. In particular, the coefficient estimates of the yearspecific treatment effects in Column 7 are very close to their counterparts in Column 5.
The bottom line from the series of difference-in-difference estimations reported in Table 4 is that the preliminary findings from the descriptive analysis are confirmed. In particular, we note that the strong effect of the Supreme Court decision on electoral competition is statistically significant and robust to various and substantial changes in specification.
A potential objection to our identification approach might be the low variation in the number of third party and independent candidates in Illinois.
Based on the descriptive evidence reported in Table 3 and Figure 1 , one could argue that our approach comes close to comparing the variation in the number of candidates in the treatment districts to a variable which is constant over time in most districts belonging to the control group. In that case the difference-in-difference approach could be misleading, as the variation in electoral competition in Illinois might simply be suppressed by the very special circumstances of this particular state, namely its highly restrictive ballot ac- , Illinois (1952 Illinois ( -1984 , Indiana (1952 Indiana ( -1980 , Kentucky (1952 -1976 ) and New Jersey (1952 -1984 .
cess law. To address this point, we extend our analysis by expanding the control group by congressional districts from three additional states: Indiana, Kentucky and New Jersey. We selected these states based on two criteria:
Firstly, we can only make use of districts from states that did not change their ballot access laws during at least a substantial part of the time period under consideration. Secondly, in order to induce more substantial variation in electoral competition within the control group, the ballot access laws of the additional states should be significantly less restrictive than those in Illinois. A quick inspection reveals that the number of third party and independent candidates now exhibits substantial variation both before and after 1968.
Difference-in-difference estimations based on the extended sample should therefore provide us with a valid point of reference for the results discussed above.
Note that we cannot employ all observations in our estimations since Indiana and Kentucky altered their ballot access rules towards the end of the period considered. We therefore restrict attention to the period from 1952 to 1976. The results based on the extended sample are reported in Table 6 . Column 1 again shows the baseline specification including a full series of state dummies, while Column 2 repeats the estimation with a full series of year effects instead of a single indicator for post-shock-periods. We obtain highly significant estimates of the treatment effect in both cases, with slightly lower point estimates compared to the estimations with only districts from Illinois forming the control group. Following the example of the results presented in Table   4 , Column 3 replaces the single treatment effect by year specific interactions.
Again, we find all estimated parameters to be positive, and three out of four effects are significant at least at the 5% level. Finally, Column 4 demonstrates that adding a time trend specific to districts in Ohio does nothing to our main results.
We conclude that adding congressional districts from three additional states to extend the control group and to induce higher variation in electoral competition within this subsample confirms the results derived from estimations where the control group comprises only districts from Illinois.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of barriers to entry on electoral competition.
In particular, we provide evidence on the impact of ballot access restrictions on entry decisions of third party and independent candidates. We note that earlier studies have failed to take account of the likely endogeneity of ballot access requirements. Building on recent contributions by Aghion et al. (2004) and Trebbi et al. (2007) claiming that political institutions should generally be treated as endogenous, we suggest an identification approach that exploits exogenous variation in the stringency of ballot access requirements. The identification rests on the idea to utilize the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 1968 to strike down Ohio's ballot access law and the resulting sharp decrease in signature requirements for third party and independent candidates in Ohio as a natural experiment. By means of difference-in-difference estimations using observations from electoral races in U.S. House elections from 1952 to 1984, we identify the effectiveness of ballot access restrictions in terms of reduced electoral competition.
Our results indicate that ballot access requirements as used in most U.S. states can be highly effective in reducing the degree of electoral competition faced by major party candidates. This finding, in turn, suggests to take serious the potential endogeneity of political institutions in empirical applications, in particular in cases where it is plausible to assume that stakes of powerful players in the political arena are directly affected by the design of the institutional environment. Hence, the empirical evidence presented in this study strongly suggests to understand political institutions as being subject to strategic choice of influential actors such as governments and legislatures.
